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manufactured by Churchill Downs, Inc."' The only mention of any-
thing that approached an injury to substance was a slight inconven-
ience in the mixing of the mail and freight of the two companies. In
view of these facts this case must stand for the proposition that a
name is to be protected as a name, and that it is not necessary to
show an injury to substance.
ANDREW CLARK.
THE POWER OF THE GOVERNOR TO REVOKE A CALL FOR AN
EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
The governor of this state does not have the power to adjourn
the legislature where it has convened and organized, except in certain
emergencies as provided for by the constitution.' Nor has the legis-
lature the power to convene itself in extraordinary session in the
absence of a constitutional provision to that effect. 2
The power of the governor to revoke a call for a special session
of the legislature previous to the organization of such session is a
more complicated question and has only been adjudicated twice in the
United States.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska in the case of People v. Parker,
in construing a constitutional provision4 vesting in the governor the
power to call an extraordinary session of the legislature, held in a
two-to-one opinion that the governor could revoke such call in his dis-
cretion, prior to the meeting and organization of the legislature. The
Court of Appeals of Kentucky in the case of Royster, Clerk v. Brock,'
by a four-to-three opinion reached just the opposite result in constru-
ing a constitutional provision 6 similar to that the Nebraska Court had
under consideration.
The constitutions of both Nebraska and Kentucky specifically vest
in the governor the power of convening an extraordinary session of
the general assembly. Neither constitution specifically provides for
the revocation of such call. The Nebraska Court finds that the chief
executive, having the authorized power to convene the general as-
sembly, has the implied power to revoke such call. The Kentucky Court
finds that no such implied power exists. The majority opinion in the
Nebraska Court and the minority opinion in the Kentucky Court indi-
cate that the fact that the governor is constituted chief executive of
the State should have some weight in determining whether such
power could be exercised. The majority of the Kentucky Court, on the
"Churchill Downs Distilling Co. v. Churchill Downs, Inc., 262 Ky.
567 at 575, 90 S. W. (2d) 1041 at 1045 (1936).
'Taylor v. Beckham, 108 Ky. 278, 56 S. W. 177.
263 P. 635, 56 A. L. R. 706.
'People v. Parker, 3 Neb. 409, 19 Am. Rep. 634.
Neb. Const., Sec. 9.
258 Ky. 146, 79 S. W. (2d) 707.
'Ky. Const., Sec. 80.
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contrary, are of the opinion that the fact that the governor is con-
stituted the chief executive has no weight in determining the ques-
tion; saying in this respect: "The right to convene the assembly
does not inhere to the office of governor, nor is it a necessary incident
to the office. The statement of the Kentucky Court seems to be cor-
rect, both from a historical standpoint and the interpretation placed
on the inherent powers of the chief executive by the courts, or as
stated In Richardson v. Young: 7 "The chief executive has no peroga-
tire powers as in monarchial governments but only such as are vested
in him by the fundamental law." It seems to be a sound conclusion
to state that the constitutional provision making the governor the
chief executive confers on him no specific power to convene or revoke
a special session of the legislature, although that office seems to be
the natural repository of the power to issue a call for a special session
as shown by the unanimity by which the governor is given such power
under the various state constitutions.
In fact, under rules of constitutional construction, there is no
occasion to construe the provision constituting the governor the chief
executive with the provision vesting in him as governor the right to
call a special session of the legislature, as they do not relate to the
same subject or make different provisions concerning the same subject.
In the matter of deciding whether the Kentucky Court reached
the correct decision in this case certain rules for the construction of
constitutional provisions are of little or. no benefit. For instance there
is no basis historically for vesting in the governor such power, nor
Is there the slightest trace of contemporaneous construction vesting
in the governor such power.
Nor does it seem that the cases cited in the opinion of the Ken-
tucky Court denying the governor the power to revoke or recall his
signature to a bill, or denying him the right to remove an officer in
certain cases, or denying him the right to revoke a pardon, are of any
material benefit in arriving at the correct solution of the problem in-
volved, except insofar as they show the strictness of the courts in
construing constitutional provisions, and their averseness to extending
the power of the governor by implication. The holding in those cases
was reached through the construction of constitutional provisions
wholly dissimilar from the one the court had under consideration in
this case. In those cases the act of the governor was considered final
and irrevocable because the rights of third persons had vested pre-
vious to the attempted revocation. Our question here is whether the
act Is final and irrevocable. If it is, the problem is solved.
As stated, since many of the usual rules of arriving at the proper
construction of this constitutional provision have no application, re-
sort must be had to the words of the provision itself and the purpose
of the people in formulating and adopting the provision, as indicated
by those words, in order to reach the proper decision.
7122 Tenn. 471, 125 S. W. 664, 669.
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If we are correct in the premise that the governor has no inher-
ent power to call a special session of the general assembly, the ques-
tion narrows down to whether the express grant of power to call an
extraordinary session carries with it, by implication the power to
revoke such a call before it is acted upon; nr in short, whether the
power of the governor is exhausted when the call is issued. The Ken-
tucky Court in this respect held that the governor exhausted his
power when he completed the last act which he had the authority to
perform, i. e., the issuance of the call; that his right to call the gen-
eral assembly is a delegated and limited power which derives from the
constitution, and he can act only in the specified manner and can exer-
cise only the power granted to him.
In the case of Field v. People,9 the Illinois Court well stated the
rule for the determination of constitutional powers by implication,
saying: "When the constitution gives a general power, or enjoins
a duty, it also gives by implication every particular power necessary
for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other. The impli-
cation under this rule, however, must be a necessary, not a conjec-
tural or argumentative one." The courts seem to give the word
"necessary", as used in the rule as laid down by the Illinois Court
for the determination of powers by implication, great flexibility of
meaning, ranging from mere convenience to that which is indispen-
sable to the accomplishment of a purpose.0
If the purpose to be accomplished is merely the promulgation of
the call for a special session of the legislature, the governor can clearly
accomplish that purpose even though the power to revoke the procla-
mation is denied him. To hold that this is the purpose of the power
does not seem to be reasonable. The evident purpose was to vest in
the governor the power to call a special session in situations where
the governor deemed an emergency existed that required action on the
part of the legislature. If the emergency ceased to exist before the
call was acted upon is it reasonable to assume that the framers of the
constitution intended the mere issuance of the call to be a final and
irrevocable act? As pointed out in the minority opinion of the Ken-
tucky Court, an emergency could exist at the time of the call and
through unforeseen events not exist before the convention of the
legislature. For instance a previous legislature had enacted a tax
measure and the collection of the tax was prevented by the taxpayers
through an injunction granted on the theory -that the measure was un-
constitutional. This created a situation where additional revenue was
deemed by the governor to be essential, and he issues a call for a
special session to enact a revenue measure. After the call and before
it is acted upon the Supreme Court dissolves the injunction and de-
clares the tax measures valid, thereby relieving the emergency and
8Note 5, supra.
92 Scam. (3 Ill.) 79.
1*43 Ill. 307; 19 So. 202; 4 Wheat. 414.
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making a special session of the legislature altogether unnecessary.
Even so under the decision of the Kentucky Court the legislature
would have to convene as the governor when he issued the call per-
formed the last act he was authorized to perform.
Suppose the governor decides to issue a call for a special session
and accordingly has the proper proclamation drawn up and executes it.
Later in the day he learns that he had not been correctly informed
as to the true status of the matter for which the proclamation was to
issue and therefore decides not to issue the call. However, he leaves
the proclamation lying on his desk and his secretary, not being ad-
vised, sends the proclamation out. Can the governor revoke the call
here? Presumably not under the decision of the Kentucky Court.
The Kentucky Court, although they do not base their decision
upon It, present the theory that if the governor -was allowed to re-
voke the call, even though urgent reasons existed for such call, he
might be subjected to such pressure by interests that would be affected
thereby that he would cancel the call. This argument would be just as
effective the other way. That is the governor might be induced by
special interests to convene the legislature, and upon sane reflection
decide that a special session would be an unnecessary expense. How-
ever, this is all beside the point for if the power exists the fact that
it might be abused would not deprive the governor of the power.
Of course occasions for the exercise of such power seldom arise,
but there are many instances that could occur in which on the basis
of reason the governor should have such power, and it seems to me
that in many instances such power would be necessary for the gov-
ernor to effectually carry out the power granted to him. The court
in arriving at the proper construction of a section of the constitution
must consider the reason for and the purpose of its adoptionU There
is no way of determining the purpose of the adoption of this provision
except through reasoning from the provision itself, but it should be
given a practical interpretation,- rather than an impracticable one.
C. D. C.PENTER.
POWER OF APPOINTMENT-APPOINTED PROPERTY AS
ASSETS OF THE DONEE
A devised Blackacre to B for life with an express provision giving
B a right to dispose of Blackacre by will. In the event B failed to
dispose of Blackacre by will A made other provisions for its disposi-
tion. B devised Blackacre to C for life with remainder to C's issue.
On her death B's creditors seek to subject Blackacre to the satisfaction
of their debts. In the case of St. Matthews Bank v. De Charette, the
Kentucky Court held that B's creditors had no claim to Blackacre,
even though B was given a general power of appointment by will and
had exercised that power in favor of volunteers, viz., C and C's issue.
1153 Ky. 604, 156 S. W. 154, 44 L. R. A., N. S. 989.
"234 Ky. 473, 28 S. W. (2d) 745.
1259 Ky. 802, 83 S. W. (2d) 471 (1935).
